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Constitutional Law Symposium: Allocation of 
Policymaking Authority Between Court and 
Legislature 
O n  November 7, 1975, the J. Reuben Clark Law School at  
Brigham Young University conducted a symposium on constitu- 
tional law. Participants included Robert G. Dixon, Jr. of Wash- 
ington University, Edward L. Barrett of the  University of Cali- 
fornia at  Davis, Gerald Gunther of Stanford University, Arvo 
Van  Alstyne of the University of Utah, Laurence H. Tribe of 
Harvard University, and C. Keith Rooker of  Brigham Young 
University. Although the lectures and comments dealt primarily 
with judicial use of the  due process and equal protection clauses, 
the central inquiry of the  symposium was broader, focusing on 
the constitutional allocation of policymaking authority between 
the judiciary and the legislature. Two of the participants, Pro- 
fessors Dixon and Barrett, developed their key lectures into the 
articles printed here. Dean Rex E. Lee, the  symposium's chief 
architect, introduces those articles with a preface defining and 
setting i n  i t s  historical context t h e .  central inquiry of the 
Introduction 
Rex E. Lee* 
In the Slaughter-House Cases of 1873,' the first test of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court held 
that none of the three provisions of that Amendment-due pro- 
cess, equal protection, or privileges and immunities-could be 
, 
utilized as a substantive restraint on state legi~lation.~ The con- 
trary position of the Slaughter-House dissenters3 remained in 
* Assistant United States Attorney General, Civil Division; Dean (on leave), J. Reu- 
ben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University; B.A., 1960, Brigham Young Univer- 
sity; J.D. 1963, University of Chicago. 
1. 83 U S .  (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
2. Id. a t  74-83. The legislation contested in the Slaughter-House Cases conferred 
upon the Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company (a corpora- 
tion) the exclusive right, for a period of 25 years, "to maintain slaughterhouses, landings 
for cattle and stockyards" within three ~arishes. The three parishes contained a popula- 
tion of over 200,000, including the City of New Orleans, and covered an area of 1,154 
square miles. The law was also attacked on Thirteenth Amendment grounds. Id. a t  38- 
43. 
3. Mr. Justice Field's dissenting opinion was joined by Chief Justice Chase, Mr. 
Justice Swayne, and Mr. Justice Bradley. Justices Bradley and Swayne also wrote sepa- 
rate dissenting opinions. Id. a t  83. 
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embryo for the next two decades until in Allgeyer u. L ~ u i s i a n a , ~  
the Court for the first time invalidated a state statute because its 
substance was incompatible with the Fourteenth Amend- 
ment-specifically, the liberty component of the due process 
clause. 
A llgeyer and its progeny-including such notable precedents 
as Lochner u. New Y01-k'~ Coppage v. Kansas,' and Adkins v. 
Children's Hospital7-represented prevailing Supreme Court 
doctrine for over a third of a century. This was a period in which 
the Court invalidated many state legislative programs, mostly 
economic, on the grounds of substantive inconsistency with the 
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee against deprivation of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law. Since federal 
judges were guided by nothing more concrete than their own 
subjective perceptions concerning the substantive content of the 
due process clause, they were necessarily cast in the role of policy- 
makers-or, a t  least, policy-reviewers with a veto power- 
concerning economic issues. 
I t  is conventional wisdom that Allgeyer and its progeny rep- 
resent one of the clearest, and most serious, examples of judicial 
misguidance in our constitutional history. Thus, the Supreme 
Court observed in a unanimous opinion in Williamson v. Lee 
Optical - C O . ~  that "[tlhe day is gone when this Court uses the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down 
state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, be- 
cause they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with 
a particular school of thought . . . ."' Furthermore, in the eco- 
nomic context to which the label "substantive due process" tradi- 
tionally attaches, the rhetoric has been matched by consistent 
holding. Since 1936,1° the Supreme Court has not invalidated any 
4. 165 U.S. 578 (1897). 
5. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
6. 236 U.S. 1 (1915). 
7. 261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
8. 348 U.S. 483 (1955). See also Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Day-Brite 
Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952); Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwest- 
ern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949); Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941). 
9. 348 U.S. at 488. 
10. The historical shift to the present standard that economic regulatory statutes are 
valid so long as they "have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are 
neither arbitrary nor discriminatory" came in Nebbia v. New York, 291 US. 502, 537 
(1934). The firmness of the Nebbia precedent was temporarily called into question when 
the Court adhered to Adkins v. Children's Hospital in Morehead v. New York ex rel. 
Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936). Nebbia's place in history was assured when, ten months after 
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state economic regulatory program on grounds of substantive in- 
compatibility with the due process clause. 
It is the opinion of some, however, that the assumed inter- 
ment of Allgeyer, Lochner, and similar cases is illusory, and that 
although their return as resurrected beings has assuredly taken a 
different, noneconomic form, the mischiefmaking substance of 
such cases as Griswold v .  Connecticut,ll Kramer v. Union Free 
School District No. 15, l 2  and Roe u. Wade13 is the same. The only 
real difference, according to this view, is the nature of the individ- 
ual interests which trigger the substitution of the wisdom of the 
judges for the wisdom of the legislators. 
The similarities and differences between the old and the new 
cases in which the Supreme Court and other federal courts have 
invalidated legislative policy decisions because of substantive 
inconsistency with the Fourteenth Amendment are of great his- 
torical interest. It is a t  least equally important to constitutional 
lawyers, however, whether in either the A llgeyer-Lochner- 
Coppage or the Griswold-Kramer-Roe setting the judicial per- 
formance was wise or constitutionally acceptable. 
The catchphrase notwithstanding, the issue is not whether 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has sub- 
stantive content. It clearly has, as the incorporation cases illus- 
trate.14 Nor is the issue limited to the due process clause, or even 
to the Fourteenth Amendment, although that Amendment has 
surely been the principal testing ground. Rather, in my view, the 
fundamental issue concerns the allocation of policymaking au- 
thority between the legislative and judicial branches of govern- 
the Morehead decision, Adkins was overruled by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 
379 (1937). 
Morehead and West Coast Hotel were both 5-4 decisions, and Mr. Justice Roberts, 
the author of the majority opinion in Nebbia (also 5-4), was with the majority in both 
cases. President Roosevelt had announced his court-packing plan after Morehead and 
before West Coast Hotel, leading to speculation that the reason for Justice Roberts' shift 
was to lessen the pressure for court-packing. Justice Roberts' explanation, in a memoran- 
dum left with Justice Frankfurter, is that the conference vote in West Coast Hotel was 
taken weeks before the announcement of the court-packing plan, and that he voted to 
adhere to Adkins in Morehead because in that case, unlike West Coast Hotel, the petition- 
ers did not ask the Court to overrule Adkins. See Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Roberts, 104 
U. PA. L. REV. 311 (1955). See also G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 583 (9th ed. 1975). 
11. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
12. 395 U.S. 621 (1969). 
13. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
14. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 361 U.S. 643 (1961). 
40 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1976: 
ment. The fact that the governmental entities involved are typi- 
cally a state legislature and a federal court imparts a layer of 
federalism over this fundamental separation of powers problem. 
Initially, it might appear that phrasing the issue in terms of 
the allocation of policymaking authority between legislators and 
judges is necessarily to imply the answer. This, in fact, represents 
my own bottom-line judgment.15 The analysis is not easy, how- 
ever, and the relevant considerations-although fundamental to 
our constitutional system-do not all point in the same direction. 
On the one hand, policymaking is the essential and tradi- 
tional domain of the Legislature. Not being constitutionally lim- 
ited in their processes by the case or controversy requirement, 
legislatures are free to investigate and consider all relevant as- 
pects of policy problems and not just those that are presented by 
disputes between particular individuals. Public money is avail- 
able, a t  the will of the Legislature, for whatever hearings, studies, 
or other investigative work is required to develop and illuminate 
the underlying facts. Courts, by contrast, are dependent on the 
typically more limited resources of private litigants. Moreover, if 
one accepts the relevance of public opinion to public policy, it is 
significant that legislators, unlike most judges, are elected by the 
people and periodically must answer to them. In short, legislators 
are more capable than courts both of making good policy deci- 
sions and of adequately reflecting the public view. 
On the other hand, judicial involvement in policymaking has 
been a mainstay of our constitutional system almost from the 
beginning. It is an involvement that follows ineluctably from the 
doctrine of judicial review and the vagueness of the most impor- 
tant  provisions of the United States Constitution. Given the 
breadth and imprecision of such terms as "freedom of speech," 
"due process, " "equal protection," and "regulate commerce," the 
process of pouring content into such terms will necessarily result 
in policymaking that is both extensive in scope and significant in 
impact. Since Marbury v. Madison,16 the responsibility for defin- 
ing these terms-in the absence of constitutional amend- 
ment-belongs to the judiciary. Judicial policymaking has there- 
fore been a constitutional fact of life for a t  least 170 years. 
Moreover, the dominant purpose of the American Constitu- 
tion is the preservation and protection of individual rights against 
15. See Lee, Mr. Herbert Spencer and the Bachelor Stockbroker; Kramer v. Union 
Free School District No. 15, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 457 (1973). 
16. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
371 INTRODUCTION 41 
governmental action. In the usual case, these are minority rights, 
not just in the ethnic sense, but also because the views, interests, 
and practices protected are not shared by most people. It 
arguable follows that judicial deference to a branch of Govern- 
ment that is selected by, and answerable to, the majority would 
compromise the judges' responsibilities as guardians of individual 
rights, which are usually minority rights. 
The subject of this symposium is one of the great enduring 
issues of constitutional law. It concerns a problem whose exist- 
ence follows inevitably from the judicial policymaking that is not 
only permitted but required by the confluences of judicial review 
and constitutional vagueness. The resulting tension between the 
basic functions of two branches of Government makes the present 
subject an important one for students of constitutional law at all 
stages of their understanding and professional development. 
